U.S. failure in Afghanistan was driven by a system that rewarded generals, diplomats, contractors, and policymakers who reported successes on the ground rather than the grim reality of a bloody insurgency, according to the watchdog who spent 12 years observing the war unravel.
The result, said one U.S. military adviser, was that the system ‘became a self-licking ice cream cone’ as more money was committed to justify the billions already spent.
John Sopko, the U.S. special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, will deliver his final report later this year.
It will reveal that experts and government officials now believe that decisions made as far back as 2002 meant the war was doomed to fail.
And it will highlight how American ignorance of Afghan culture, the impact of local corruption, plus weak cooperation between U.S. agencies all contributed to a war effort that left the country back in Taliban hands at a cost of more than 2,400 American lives and $2 trillion.
Yet, writes Sopko in a New York Times opinion piece published Thursday, you wouldn’t know it from the optimistic reports coming from the officers and officials in charge at the time.
‘But a perverse incentive drove our system,’ he writes.
‘To win promotions and bigger salaries, military and civilian leaders felt they had to sell their tours of duty, deployments, programs and projects as successes — even when they were not.
‘Leaders tended to report and highlight favorable information while obscuring that which pointed to failure. After all, failures do not lead to an ambassadorship or an elevation to general.’